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ABSTRACT 
The contributions of physics to the Allied victory in World 
War II made clear that the maintenance of national security 
required major public investment in scientific research and 
training. By the late 1940s, the United States government 
was spending about one billion dollars annually on research 
and development (R&D), mainly through the Department of 
Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. The Korean War 
drove these expenditures permanently higher. Between 1945 
and 1957, defense-related agencies formed the principal 
patrons of the country's civilian science. At the same 
time, civilian scientists became deeply engaged in advising 
the government upon the technologies of national security, 
obtaining access to the White House with the creation, in 
1951, of the Science Advisory Committee, through which they 
helped accelerate the nation's missile development program. 
Under this patronage and influence, physics flourished--
both high-energy particle physics and branches of physics 
such as quantum and micro-electronics that were directly 
related to national security. The result was a 
diversification of physics and its integration across a 
broad front into the R&D network of national security. 

Physicists won World War II with radar and ended it with the 
atomic bomb, decisively eliminating the need to risk ground troops in 
an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands -- so the history of the war 
was instantly understood by physicists and policymakers in the United 
States. The consequences seemed clear: National security would depend, 
henceforth, upon technological superiority; nuclear weapons and other 
military technologies could offset the Soviet manpower advantage in 
postwar Europe. Technological superiority, in turn, needed state 
programs and facilities of scientific research, and state efforts to 
enlarge the nation's pool of people trained in relevant technical 
disciplines, especially physics, the practitioners of which had been in 
notably short supply during the war. 
Some of the research could be conducted where it had 
traditionally been carried out -- in government laboratories but 
among the key lessons drawn from the success of the wartime 
mobilization under the Office of Scientific Research and Development 
(OSRD) was that a significant part of the work had to exploit the 
civilian scientific sector outside government -- that is, the 
laboratories of both industry and -- for the most innovative work -- of 
academia. Here -- at least in the view of the civilian scientific 
veterans of OSRD -- was where fresh thinking and activity on the 
frontiers of science were the norm. Here was where the ideas for 
radical new weapons and weapons systems would most likely originate 
especially if its knowledgeable civilian scientists were kept involved 
in the forging of national strategic policy. As Vannevar Bush, the head 
of OSRD, had argued as early as 1941, only by drawing upon scientific 
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experts familiar with the latest laboratory products could military 
planners know the best way to exploit new weapons. Only by having 
access to the military's strategic requirements could defense 
scientists best understand the kinds of weapons that needed 
developing. 1] 
By 1949/50, the eve of the Korean War, the federal government 
was spending some $1 billion for R&D, which was almost $300 million 
more than it had allocated for the purpose in 1946, the year of 
demobilization. Most of it -- 90% -- came about equally from the new 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Department of Defense (DOD). 
Defense-related research loomed large everywhere in the civilian 
scientific sector. The military spent $350 million dollars on research 
in industrial laboratories, accounting for about 25% of the total 
dollar performance in the industrial R&D sector. 2 ] The Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) was by far the principal patron of academic science, 
sponsoring some 1200 research projects in almost 200 universities, 
including the construction and maintenance of a number of on-campus 
accelerators for unclassified work in nuclear and particle physics. ONR 
1 Daniel J. Kevles, The Physicists: The History of a Scientific 
Community in Modern America (1987), p. 308. 
2 William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with E. U. 
Condon, Director, National Bureau of Standards, and Messrs. Hugh 
Odishaw and N.E. Golovin, Assistants to the Director," Oct. 31, 1950, 
p. 3, William T. Golden MSS; "Research and Development in the United 
States, 1941-1952," table attached to Oliver Buckly to James Killian, 
Oct. 26, 1951, Karl T. Compton/James R. Killian MSS, MIT Archives 
(hereafter, C/K MSS), Box 256, folder 10; Forman, "Behind Quantum 
Electronics: National Security as a Basis for Physical Research in the 
United States, 1940-1960," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, 18:1(1987), p. 211. 
3 
assisted some 2,500 science students towards their Ph.D.s., while the 
Atomic Energy Commission provided some 800 fellowships a year in the 
physical and biomedical sciences. In 1949, the Defense Department 
together with the AEC accounted for 96 percent of all federal dollars 
spent on the campuses for research in the physical sciences. For every 
two of those dollars spent by the AEC, the military spent at least 
three. 3 ] 
The gross features of this transformation in relationships 
between civilian science and the American state have been known for 
some time, particularly as they were manifest in the areas of nuclear 
and thermonuclear weapons as well as high-energy physics. However, 
recent historical inquiry has begun to provide a view of these matters 
that is at once wider in view and higher in resolution. This work 
permits us to probe with more concrete specificity -- and challenges us 
to reconsider -- how the pressures and opportunities of national 
security shaped the American physics enterprise in the decade or so 
after World War 11.4] 
3 Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), pp. 156, 204, 186-
7; Chart, "Research and Development Obligations of the Department of 
Defense," Fig. 2, attached to "Science Advisory Committee, Summary, Mtg. 
No.3," Sept. 18, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 10; Kevles, The 
Physicists (1987), pp. 355, 359; William T. Golden, Memos to File, 
"Conversation with Kenneth Pitzer, Director, Research Division, AEC," 
Oct. 31, 1950, p. 1; "Conversation with Rear Admiral T. Solberg, 
Director of Office of Naval Research," Jan. 15, 1951 as of Jan. 10, 
1951, p. 1, Golden MSS; S. S. Schweber, "Big Science in Context: 
Cornell and MIT," unpublished paper, Workshop on Big Science, Stanford 
University, August 1988, p. 27. 
4 I have particularly in mind the investigations of J.L. Hei1bron 
and coworkers, which have enriched considerably our knowledge of the 
history of nuclear and high-energy physics at levels of both the 
national agencies and local institutions; and also the writings of 
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Among the key issues in the science-security nexus were two: 
What kind of research was needed to maintain the nation's technological 
superiority? And how was that research to be organized and advanced? To 
many leaders of American physics, major investment had to be made in 
pure science, which was commonly exemplified in the discussions of the 
late 1940s by the abstruse prewar nuclear explorations that had made 
possible the invention of the atomic bomb. Yet many physicists conceded 
-- and a number of them enthusiastically stressed -- that also needed 
was research closely related to the technologies of national security 
(for example, the behavior of electromagnetic radiation at the 
frequencies of microwave radar, or of the processes in nuclear reactors 
designed to produce weapons-grade fissionable material). In a world 
perfect for physicists, there would be resources and latitude enough 
for both. However, in the United States the technological had always 
tended to command more attention than the pure. Now that problem loomed 
all the larger, since the principal patron of research was to be the 
federal government, which in the country's practically oriented culture 
was more naturally an ally of the technological than of the pure. It 
was also an article of faith that pure research thrived on autonomy and 
openness, while technological projects tended to be targeted and often 
to operate under information restrictions. Then, too, research in even 
scholars such as Paul Forman, Stuart W. Leslie, S.S. Schweber, Peter 
Galison, Clayton Koppes, Allan Needell, and David Devorkin, which have 
brought space and missile physics as well as microelectronics into the 
field of historical inquiry. Much of this work has appeared in HSPS: 
Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences. Entry into 
this literature is to be found in the Bibliography appended to this 
essay. Specific references to items in it are, of course, contained in 
the notes. 
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esoteric areas of knowledge, now freighted with the weight of national 
security, was threatened with controlled direction and security 
restrictions. 
In some areas, some of these tensions were dealt with by 
segregating the technological from the pure. In 1949-50, only about 9% 
of DOD R&D obligations went for research in universities and other non-
profits. Some 54% of them were for work in industry. About 36% of DOD 
research dollars went to government laboratories, including such 
civilian facilities as the National Bureau of Standards. 5 ] Each of the 
armed services had enlisted academia in the cause of weapons technology 
but by arrangements -- they had originated during the war -- under 
which leading universities managed separate major weapons research 
facilities for defense agencies. University-connected laboratories 
under DOD sponsorship included the Jet Propulsion Laboratory at the 
California Institute of Technology and the Applied Physics Laboratory 
of The Johns Hopkins University, the former a ward of Army Ordnance, 
the latter of Navy Ordnance -- and both devoted to basic research 
related to the development of guided missiles. 6 ] 
5 Paul Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), p. 180; James 
Forrestal to Karl T Compton, Sept. 30, 1948; Chart, "Research and 
Development Obligations of the Department of Defense," Fig. 2, attached 
to "Science Advisory Committee, Summary, Mtg. No.3," Sept. 18, 1951, 
CIK MSS, Box 245, Folder 16; Box 256, folder 10. 
6 Clayton R. Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program: A History 
of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (1982), pp. 18-34; Michael Aaron 
Dennis, "No Fixed Position: University Laboratories and Military 
Patronage at Johns Hopkins and MIT, 1944-46," unpublished paper (1987). 
Army Ordnance's sponsorship of JPL expressed sharply the change in the 
military's attitude toward civilian science. The footsoldier's Army had 
long been the most backward of the services with respect to scientific 
research. Ordnance, which received about two thirds of Army R&D funds, 
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The Atomic Energy Commission managed the tension, as Robert 
Seidel has told us, by differentiating its installations into 
"laboratories primarily devoted to programmatic research with limited 
basic research programs, and laboratories primarily devoted to basic 
research with limited applied research programs." To a considerable 
extent, the commitment to a basic research program had been brought 
about by Ernest Lawrence, whose Berkeley Radiation Laboratory was 
replete with ambitious plans for new accelerators and had been left 
well funded to begin realizing them by General Leslie R. Groves, the 
head of the terminating Manhattan Project. In 1947, the AEC fixed upon 
a policy of supporting fundamental research, a policy that led to 
bonanzas for Lawrence's Laboratory and its new east coast counterpart, 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory, on Long Island, New York.7J 
In 1949, AEC Commissioner Henry Smyth, himself a physicist, 
reflected to a group of laboratory representatives that the 
Commission's strategy for its technological installations gave the AEC 
had traditionally been prone to rely on its own laboratories, such as 
the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and to distrust civilian establishments. 
William T. Golden, Memo to File, "Meeting with Roger W. Jones, 
Assistant Director in Charge of Legislative Reference, Bureau of the 
Budget," Oct. 11, 1950, Golden MSS. See the comments on contract-
operated government laboratories in Oliver Buckley to the President, 
May 1, 1952, attached to Science Advisory Committee, "Summary, Meeting 
No. 11," May 9, 1952, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 12. 
7 J. L. Heilbron, Robert W. Seidel, and Bruce R. Wheaton, Lawrence 
and His Laboratory: Nuclear Science at Berkeley. 1931-1961 (Berkeley, 
CA: Office for History of Science and Technology, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1981), pp. 49, 60-62; Robert W. Seidel, 
"Acclerating Science: The Postwar Transformation of the Lawrence 
Radiation Laboratory," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biolo~ical Sciences, 13:2(1983), 375-400. 
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"secrecy, and big groups of scientists who will take orders, and big 
equipment. ,,8] Still, the Commission's best known technologically 
oriented installation the Los Alamos Weapons Laboratory -- was, of 
course, operated for the AEC by the University of California, a 
connection which, like DOD's arrangement with various universities, no 
doubt helped obscure the Lab's order-taking characteristics, added 
legitimacy to its claims of academic tone, and aided in the recruitment 
of high-quality staff. (Whatever the advantages of the UC connection, 
J. Robert Oppenheimer was moved to remark, in 1949, that "it is a great 
liberal university that is the only place in the world, as far as I 
know, that manufactures, under contract with the United States 
governmnent, atomic bombs." He added, "I have sometimes asked myself 
whether we can find any analogy to this situation in the practice of 
the monastic orders that devote a part of their attention and derive 
part of their sustenance from the making of their private liquers. ,,9]) 
However, on a number of campuses, the pure and the 
technological were not always sharply segregated. While the Department 
of Defense provided a good deal of money for projects in pure science 
free of most restrictions, security or otherwise, many of its 
subventions were for basic research recognized, to quote a later 
Defense Department directive, "as an integral part of programmed 
8 Seidel, "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy Commission's 
Laboratory System," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, 16:1(1986), 144, 148-9. 
9 Seidel, "A Home for Big Science" (1986), p. 150; J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, Uncommon Sense, eds., N. Metropolis, Gian-Carlo Rota, and 
David Sharp (1984), p. 30. 
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research commited to specific military aims." 10] 
The leading case in point was MIT, which had a strong tradition 
of emphasis on engineering and had been the home of the wartime 
Radiation Laboratory. At the end of the war, mainly at the initiative 
of the physicist John C. Slater, MIT created the Research Laboratory in 
Electronics, which was to extend the basic microwave research of the 
Rad Lab, obtained a good deal of its valuable equipment, and enjoyed a 
subvention from the three armed services that soon reached $1.5 million 
annually. A joint venture of the physics and engineering departments at 
MIT, the Laboratory was to accelerate the transfer of advanced atomic, 
molecular, solid state, and microwave physics to engineering practice, 
while employing the theories and devices its staff developed in basic 
physics research. In the late 1940s, 85% of the MIT research budget 
came from the military and the AEC. 11 ] 
The armed services sustained not only the MIT Research 
Laboratory in Electronics but similar installations at Harvard and 
10 Daniel J. Kev1es, "K1S2: Korea, Science, and the State," 
California Institute of Technology, Humanities Working Paper 134, July 
1988, p. 8. 
11 Department of Defense Directive, "Policy on Basic Research," 
June 19, 1952, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 13; Schweber, "Big Science in 
Context" (1988), pp. 3, 18, 25, 26; Stuart W. Leslie, "Playing the 
Education Game to Win: The Military and Interdisciplinary Research at 
Stanford," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological 
Sciences, 18: 1(1987), 65-66; Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" 
(1987), pp. 156, 204, 186-7. A move to bring engineering and physics 
closer together was also evident at Cornell and elsewhere (see 
Schweber, pp. 23-24), a phenomenon with precedent in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when physics, having produced 
a body of method and theory for power and electronic circuitry and 
devices, spun off electrical engineering as a new branch of 
engineering. 
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Columbia universities. 12 ] The MIT model inspired ambitious leaders at 
Stanford University to develop the Stanford Electronics Research 
Laboratories, also a cooperative activity of physics and electrical 
engineering, organized around the subject of microwaves and concerned 
with its applications in basic physics and practical technology, and 
handsomely funded -- at almost half a million dollars annually, in 1950 
-- by the three armed services. Stanford Provost Frederic Terman 
proclaimed: "After the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford 
is now the most important center of electronics among American 
universities. Although we cannot match M.I.T. in size, we concede 
nothing to them in quality and productiveness in proportion to money 
expended by sponsoring agencies. ,,13] 
Physicists, along with other scientists, were also, of course, 
involved in policy-making for the technology of national security. Some 
of the involvement took the form of consultantships and summer studies, 
like that begun in late 1949 by the MIT physicist Jerrold R. Zacharias, 
who agreed to head an investigation for ONR on ocean transport and 
antisubmarine warfare. (The study, conducted during the summer of 1950, 
was dubbed Project Hartwell, because the civilian scientists who 
carried it out dined frequently at the Hartwell Farms Restaurant, which 
was near the MIT field station in Lexington, Massachusetts, where they 
12 Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), pp. 156, 204, 186-
7. 
13 Leslie, "Playing the Education Game to Win" (1987), pp. 62, 67-
69. 
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did the work.)14] Some of the involvement consisted of participation 
in analytical cadres in the armed services for example, the Weapons 
Systems Evaluation Group that was attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
-- for planning and evaluating weapons systems. More general policy 
influence came from participation in key standing scientific advisory 
committees to each of the armed services and, in the most portentous 
area, the General Advisory Committee of the AEC. 15 ] 
Yet while physicists were influential in the making of military 
technology policy, they were rather less so in the formation of grand 
policy for national security. The armed services had by no means made 
them -- or any other civilian scientists -- full partners in strategic 
planning. While the AEC General Advisory Committee's noble, if ill-
fated, attempt in late 1949 to head off a crash program for a hydrogen 
bomb has been taken to symbolize the participation of physicists in 
14 Hartwell ran formally from March through December 1950 and cost 
$124,000, much of which went to pay the summer salaries of the 21 
civilian scientists responsible for the study. T. J. Crane to James R. 
Killian, July 23, 1954, CIK MSS, Box 257, folder 18; Jerrold R. 
Zacharias, with Myles Gordon, "Military Technology: One of the Lives of 
J .R. Zacharias," ms of a draft autobiography (1986), chapter I. 
15 Kev1es, The Physicists (1987), p. 355; Herbert York and Alan 
Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar History," Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, 33(1977), 16-17; William C. Foster to John 
Stennis, April 23, 1952, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 12; William T. 
Golden, who was surveying defense research, noted, "Advisory committees 
are becoming increasingly fashionable." Golden, Memos to File, 
"Conversation with Brigadier General L. E. Simon and Maj or General A. C. 
McAuliffe," March 1, 1951 as of Feb. 28, 1951, p. 3; File, 
"Conversation with H.P. Robertson, Deputy Director, WSEG; Dr. Louis 
Ridenour, Special Adviser to the Secretary of the Air Force and to the 
Director of Research and Development of the Air Force; and Professor 
Marshall Stone," Dec. 8, 1950, pp. 1-2; "Conversation with Lt. General 
Hull and Dr. Robertston, Director and Deputy Director of the Weapons 
System Evaluation Group," Nov. 21, 1950 as of Nov. 15, 1950, p.l, 
Golden MSS. 
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grand strategy-making, the fact of the matter was that for the most 
part the GAC dealt mainly with tecbnical and research issues. 16 ] In 
the postwar United States, physicists had become more the creatures 
than the makers of national security policy -- a policy made largely by 
others. Rather than distracting them as research scientists, the policy 
served them. In return, most willingly served the overall policy, while 
successfully constructing a system of institutional arrangements that 
served it, too. On the eve of the Korean War, radical new weapons 
the hydrogen bomb, certain types of guided missiles, and a variety of 
other hardware innovations -- were aborning, in the Atomic Energy 
Commission facilities, the Applied Physics Laboratory, the Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory, and elsewhere, not as the result of major 
scientific breakthroughs in basic research but from the success of the 
new institutional arrangements that tied civilian scientists to the 
military while keeping them relatively free of its close control. 
* * * * * * * 
With the outbreak of the Korean War, in June 1950, the defense 
R&D budget followed the overall defense budget into the stratosphere, 
doubling to slightly more than $1.3 billion in fiscal 1951, and rising 
still higher, to about $1.6 billion in fiscal 1952. Scientists wondered 
16 William T. Golden, Memos to Files, "Conversation with Dr. 
Lawrence Hafstad, Director, Reactor Development Division, Atomic Energy 
Commission," Nov. 8, 1950, p. 2; "Telephone Conversation with Dr. H.P. 
Robertson," Jan. 25, 1951, Golden MSS; remarks of Robert Seidel, 
Workshop on Big Science, Stanford University, August 1988. 
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how to make themselves useful in the war emergency. Some ruminated over 
the possibility of creating a new OSRD, but such a move was ultimately 
deemed unnecessary. 17] The war emergency could be handled by the 
defense R&D system already in place, including its contigents on the 
nation/s campuses. 
Nevertheless, the Korean War did provoke a series of important 
policy moves in saliently critical areas of military technology. In 
1950, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall established an Office of 
the Director of Guided Missiles in the Defense Department and appointed 
as head of it the industrialist K.T. Keller, who quickly became known 
as the "missile czar." In March 1950, the Air Force was given exclusive 
jurisdiction over the development of long-range strategic missiles. In 
the meantime, the Army and Navy accelerated their short-range missile 
programs. The Army transferred a team of missile engineers to the 
Huntsville Arsenal, in Huntsville, Alabama, where, under Wehrner von 
Braun, work commenced on the development of a tactical ballistic 
missile. In Pasadena, California, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
obtained authorization from Army Ordnance to move beyond basic research 
into the development of the Corporal guided missile, which would be 
designed for tactical use carrying atomic warheads in the European 
theater. Between 1950 and 1953, the JPL budget more than doubled, to 
17 Allan Neede11, "Preparing for the Space Age: University-Based 
Research, 1946-1957," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biolo~ica1 Sciences, 18:1(1987), 97-98, 101-105; Daniel J. Kev1es, 
"K1S2" (1988). 
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$11 million a year, and its staff similarly multiplied. 18] 
The Korean War also reinforced the air of emergency that had 
settled over the Atomic Energy Commission after the detection, in 
September 1949, of the first explosion of a Soviet atomic bomb. ("How 
do we get the boys away from their mesons and back into the military 
salt mines?" the Berkeley physicist Luis Alvarez had asked.) Like 
leading members of his staff, Ernest Lawrence was ready to march back 
to war, and he was instrumental in obtaining the establishment, in June 
1952, of the Livermore Weapons Laboratory -- which was to provide 
"healthy competition" for Los Alamos, Edward Teller said, and, like it, 
to operate under the egis of the University of California. The war 
stimulated pressure everwhere in the AEC laboratory complex -- even at 
pure-science oriented Brookhaven for activity in research directly 
relevant to national security. 19] 
Responding to the needs of ONR, and the offer of considerable 
additional funding, Stanford University expanded its microwave work 
into applied (and classified) areas, while laying plans to build a 
18 York and Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar 
History" (1977), pp. 17-18; Michael Armacost, The Politics of Weapons 
Innovation (1969), pp. 26-27; Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense 
Controversy (1977), pp. 37-38; William T. Golden, Memos to File, 
"Conversation with Mr. William A. Burden and Henry Loomis," Jan. 30, 
1951; "Conversation with. . Burden," Feb. 27, 1951 as of Feb. 18, 
1951, Golden MSS; Koppes, JPL and the American Space Program (1982), 
pp. 43-48. 
19 Seidel, "A Home for Big Science" (1986), pp. 152-54; Heilbron, 
Seidel, and Wheaton, Lawrence and His Laboratory, pp. 63-65, 72, 75. 
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microwave-powered high-energy accelerator with AEC money.20] 
Before the war, the Bell Telephone Laboratories had declined an Army 
Signal Corps contract offer for research on the transistor. After the 
war broke out, the Bell Labs attitude changed and by 1953 50% of its 
transistor work was being supported by the military. 21] By late 1951, 
it was estimated that DOD and AEC contracts accounted for nearly 40 
percent of all industrial and academic research effort. Defense 
research was estimated to be occupying some two thirds of the nation's 
scientists and engineers. At the American Physical Society meeting 
earlier that year, perhaps the principal non-technical topic of 
conversation was the wholesale and high-powered recruiting of 
scientists by defense agencies, especially the Air Force. Planners 
were once again concerned with shortages of technical manpower, and the 
draft status of young scientists, particularly in such critical fields 
as nuclear physics and electronics, was once again a matter of policy 
debate. 22] 
20 Leslie, "Playing the Education Game to Win" (1987), pp. 69-71; 
Peter Galison et aI, "Controlling the Monster: Stanford and the Control 
of Physics Research, 1935-1962," unpublished paper, Workshop on the 
History of Big Science, Stanford University, August 1988, pp. 19-20. 
21 Thomas J. Misa, "Military Needs . 
ed., Military Enterprise and Technological 
MIT Press, 1985), pp. 
.," in Merritt Roe Smith, 
Change (Cambridge, Mass.: 
22 Oliver E. Buckley, "An Appraisal of Some Indicated Needs of 
Defense Research . " Dec. 31, 1951, attached to "Science Advisory 
Committee, Summary of Meeting No.6," Dec. 11, 1951; Karl T. Compton, 
"The Research and Development Budget of the Department of Defense," 
Oct. 30, 1950, attached to Compton to E. O. Lawrence, Oct. 31, 1950, 
CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 11; Box 245, folder 19; William T. Golden, 
Memo to File, "Conversation with Dr. Robert F. Bacher," Feb. 6, 1951 as 
of Feb. 3, 1951, p. 2, Golden MSS; Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" 
(1987), p. 167, n. 32. 
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In the end, the Korean War fostered a series of subtle -- and 
not so subtle -- changes in the relationship between civilian science 
and the American state. Unlike World War II, the scientific 
mobilization during Korea produced no miraculous new weapons. Combined 
with the Soviet's becoming a nuclear power, however, it generated a 
pervasive psychology of permanent mobilization, a commitment to an 
expansive technological readiness. 23 ] Even during the war, the 
military's outlook had struck James B. Conant, as he told the National 
War College, as "something like the old religious phenomenon of 
conversion." Conant continued, "The military, if anything, have become 
vastly too much impressed with the abilities of research and 
development. They are no longer the conservatives. . at times they 
seem to be fanatics in their belief of what the scientists and the 
technologists can do. ,,24] 
23 George Kolstad, of the AEC's Division of Research, said, in 
January 1951, in a draft round-robin letter to university physicists: 
"We must . keep in mind that we are not at war and that the nature 
of the emergency is one of recurring crises and is such that we may 
expect it to last for a considerable length of time, perhaps ten or 
twenty years." Neede11, "Preparing for the Space Age" (1987), pp. 102-3. 
24 Conant, "The Problem of Evaluation of Scientific Research and 
Development for Military Planning," speech to the National War College, 
Feb. 1, 1952, quoted in James G. Hershberg, "'Over My Dead Body': James 
B. Conant and the Hydrogen Bomb," unpublished ms (1987), forthcoming, 
p. 50. Conant suggested to a meeting of the Science Advisory Committee 
that, in order to get better control of military research, at key 
levels every proposal for a new defense R&D project should have at 
least one designated naysayer to make a case against it. Science 
Advisory Committee, "Summary, Meeting No.7," Jan. 11, 1952, CIK MSS, 
Box 256, folder 12. Louis Ridenour, a physicist who was special adviser 
to the Secretary of the Air Force, told William Golden that any kind of 
project, no matter how far-fetched, could count on finding support in 
some branch of the military. Golden, Memo to File, "Conversation with 
H.P. Robertson .. ; Louis Ridenour .. ," Dec. 8, 1950, Golden MSS. 
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On the side of civilian science, the psychological sea change 
was typically manifest in the conclusions of Project Hartwell. Though 
Korea had no direct bearing on the content of the project, Zacharias 
recalled, the conflict "heightened our sense of purpose and underlined 
the relevance and the urgency of the task -- what it takes to fight 
half way around the world." The thick, two-volume Hartwell report dealt 
with what the Navy should do to protect shipping against Soviet forces 
in a war with theaters that spread from Europe and Latin America to 
India, Southeast Asia, and Japan. It assumed that the Soviets would be 
well armed and prepared to use all their weapons. 25 ] 
The Hartwell analyses, which ranged from technologies for the 
destruction as well as for the detection of submarines, paid particular 
attention to nuclear weapons. Zacharias recalled, "We wanted the 
military to start thinking about how to integrate atomic weapons into 
the battle plan of 'a conventional war,' a protracted affair, in which 
both sides would have ample opportunity and time to gear up, get 
prepared, and deploy forces -- without devastating destruction on both 
sides." The report sought to destroy certain myths about nuclear 
weapons, starting with the myth that all were big bombs deliverable 
only from big high-flying aircraft. Hartwell stressed that they could 
be built small, in both size and explosive power, and that they would 
be appropriate for use against submarines and their bases by a variety 
of small aircraft, including helicopters. Project Hartwell did not 
think it unreasonable for the United States to seek to equip itself 
25 Zacharias, with Myles Gordon, "Military Technology: One of the 
Lives of J.R. Zacharias" (1986), chapter I. 
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soon with 10,000 such atomic weapons. 26 ] Hartwell decidedly influenced 
Navy R&D as well as its antisubmarine doctrine (though the impact on 
the latter has been difficult to measure because of security 
restrictions). Suffice it to say that years later, naval officers 
treasured the Hartwell report as the bible of antisubmarine warfare. 27] 
The change in administrations -- and, for the first time in 
twenty years, the change in political parties brought fresh players, 
fresh arrangements, and fresh doctrines into the defense policy game. 
The salient fresh doctrine was the "New Look," which emphasized 
economies of dollar cost and troop commitments in national defense in 
favor of relying on technological advantage to counter the perceived 
Soviet threat. In short order, civilian enthusiasts of technological 
advantage, newly arrived in the office of the Secretary of Defense, 
began to prevail upon the Air Force to step up its intercontinental 
ballistic missile program, the feasibility of which seemed all the 
higher as a result of the early hydrogen bomb tests, which suggested 
that a megaton of explosive could be delivered to the Soviet Union via 
a missile less powerful than had previously been assumed. 28] 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See, for example, York and Greb, "Military Research and 
Development" (1977), pp. 20-21; Armacost, The Politics of Weapons 
Innovation (1969), pp. 28-31, 56-58. Insightful observations upon the 
Air Force's reluctance to move rapidly into an ICBM program are 
advanced in Robert L. Perry, "Commentary," in Monte D. Wright and 
Lawrence J. Paszek, eds., Science, Technology, and Warfare (1969), pp. 
119-21. 
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The change in administration also led to a more intimate 
relationship of civilian scientists to high policymaking. During the 
Korean War, on April 19, 1951, Truman had established a Science 
Advisory Committee in the Office of Defense Mobilization to provide 
advice not only to the director of the Office but to the president on 
scientific matters, particularly in connection with national defense. 
In June 1952, Lee DuBridge, the head of the MIT Radiation Laboratory 
during the war, became chairman of the group, whose other members also 
represented key veterans -- many of them physicists of the wartime 
scientific mobilization and key players in the postwar military 
advisory system. 29 ] The establishment of the Science Advisory 
Committee had put scientists institutionally within reach of the White 
House; Eisenhower took them inside of it. The committee was kept 
apprised of relevant discussions in the National Security Council by 
its chairman, Robert Cutler, and, eventually, by its own executive 
secretary, David Beckler, who sat in on NSC meetings. 30 ] 
The committee, much impressed by Project Hartwell, thought 
highly of analyses of weapons as they might be integrated into 
strategy. At the urging of Jerrold Zacharias, the group decided to seek 
a meeting with the President and the National Security Council to urge 
the creation of a special group to study the overall problem of science 
29 Truman to Oliver Buckley, April 19, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 256, 
folder 8; Press Release, April 20, 1951, Golden MSS. 
30 Conversation with Lee DuBridge, July 15, 1988; I. I. Rabi, "The 
President and His Scientific Advisers," in William T. Golden, ed., 
Science Advice to the President (1980), pp. 21-22; DuBridge to Members 
of the Science Advisory Committee, Feb. 15, 1954, CIK MSS, Box 257, 
folder 2. 
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and national defense. 31 ] On March 27, 1954, the committee met with the 
Eisenhower, who focused attention on the problem of surprise attack and 
asked that his science advisors conduct a study of the matter. The 
request led to the formation of the Technological Capabilities Panel 
under James R. Killian, which interpreted its charge broadly and set 
about investigating not only the gathering of intelligence to guard 
against surprise attack but also several other topics, including what 
technology might do for the retaliatory power of American 
deterrence. 32] In February 1955, the panel delivered its report, 
stressing, in a tone of foreboding, that the United States was 
vulnerable to surprise attack and urging, among other things, that the 
country establish overflight surveillance of the Soviet Union and give 
highest priority to the development of both long-range and intermediate 
range ballistic missiles. The panel presented its recommendations in 
an extended discussion of the National Security Council -- a session 
that Robert Cutler recalled as the high point of deliberations during 
his tenure as the president's special assistant for national 
31 "Meeting of the Cambridge-New York Group of the Science 
Advisory Committee," March 10, 1954, attached to Killian to Beckler, 
March 17, 1954; Beckler to Killian, March 19, 1954 and attached "Scope 
of Proposed Examination of New Weapons and National Strategy," draft, 
March 19, 1954, CIK MSS, Box 257, folders 2, 18; enthusiasm for 
Hartwell-type projects was manifest at the meeting and also earlier in 
Oliver E. Buckley, "Notes on Report of the Committee on Plans for 
Mobilizing Science," draft, June 8, 1951, attached to Buckley to 
Killian, June 15, 1951, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 9. 
32 James R. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower (1977), 
pp. 70-71; DuBridge to Flemming, July 21, 1954, CIK MSS, Box 257, 
folder 18 .. 
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security. 33] The recommendations helped obtain the highest national 
priority for the ICBM program and also precipitated what became the 
Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris programs. 34] 
The extensive military patronage of basic civilian science had 
worried a number of the nation's scientific leaders a good deal before 
the Korean War. DuBridge had declared, "When science is allowed to 
exist merely from the crumbs that fall from the table of a weapons 
development program then science is headed into the stifling atmosphere 
of 'mobilized secrecy' and it is surely doomed -- even though the 
crumbs themselves should provide more than adequate nourishment." 
Unversity scientists were constantly -- and rightly -- apprehensive 
that the military might impose security restrictions on their research. 
Some worried that the military's overwhelming presence in university 
science would distort its intellectual direction. 35 ] A number hoped 
that the situation would improve when, in March 1950, after five years 
of dispute, President Harry S Truman finally signed into law the bill 
establishing the civilian National Science Foundation, which was 
intended to be the flagship of fundamental science in the United States 
and was expected in many quarters to take over much of the pure-
33 Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation (1969), pp. 50-
53; Killian, Sputnik. Scientists. and Eisenhower, (1977), pp. 71-86; 
Killian, "The Origin and Uses of Scientific Presence in the White 
House," in Golden, ed., Science Advice to the President (1980), p. 29. 
34 York and Greb, "Military Research and Development: A Postwar 
History" (1977), pp. 21-22. 
35 Kev1es, The Physicists (1987), pp. 378-79. 
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research activity of the mi1itary.36] 
Such concerns continued after Korea, but with much-diminished 
intensity. The war had put a hold on any serious move to transfer 
support for basic science out of the military and into the National 
Science Foundation. When the Eisenhower administration took office, it 
ventured such a transfer, perhaps out of the Republican propensity for 
efficiency. However, the Office of Naval Research had turned against 
any such idea, and the attitudes of many university scientists were no 
doubt represented by Lee DuBridge, now the head of the California 
Institute of Technology, who took arms against the move, stressing to a 
high official in the administration that the poor-relation NSF would 
have to be granted appropriations "ten times their present level" to do 
the job properly, an amount of money that Congress would surely decline 
to provide. The NSF, DuBridge added, was "wholly unsuitable for the 
support of large research projects at large research centers. The 
California Institute of Technology, for example, would go broke very 
promptly if all of its basic research support were suddenly transferred 
to the National Science Foundation. ,,37] 
While at times during the 1950s, Republican economizing 
36 Department of Defense Directive, "Policy on Basic Research," 
June 19, 1952, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 13; Kev1es, The Physicsts 
(1987), p. 356; William T. Golden, Memo to Files, "Conversation with 
Dr. Vannevar Bush," Dec. 5, 1950, Golden MSS. 
37 William T. Golden, Memos to File, "Conversation with Mr. 
Charles Stauffacher re National Science Foundation. . ," Dec. 6, 
1950; "Conversation with Rear Admiral T. Solberg, Director, Office of 
Naval Resarch," Jan. 15, 1951, Golden MSS; DuBridge to Flemming, August 
12, 1953, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 15; authors's conversation with Lee 
DuBridge, July 15, 1988;. 
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threatened to curtail defense R&D, the demands of hi-tech armament 
nuclear warheads, rockets and missiles, antisubmarine warfare and 
continental defense systems, and the like prevented federal, 
including military, research expenditures from falling; indeed, in 
areas related to these major military systems, they kept rising at a 
moderate rate. 38 ] Defense, and defense-related, agencies provided 
between 80% and 90% of federal R&D monies. They made hi-tech industrial 
research increasingly a ward of the military, with defense projects 
supplying an ever-larger fraction -- the portion crossed the 50% mark 
in 1956 --of total expenditures for industrial research. DOD and the 
AEC together were pervasive presences on the nation's campuses, the 
source of funding for the vast majority of research in physics, 
electronics, aeronautics, computers, and myriad other branches of the 
physical sciences and engineering. 39 ] 
Recently, the historian Paul Forman has contended that the 
incentives of national security, somehow, perverted American physicists 
from the course of "true basic physics," encouraging them to the self-
38 A bete noir of the basic research community was Secretary of 
Defense Charles E. Wilson, who, having spent his career at General 
Motors, where there was no significant tradition of scientific 
research, tried to cut the defense R&D budget more than once during the 
Eisenhower administration and opined while at the Pentagon that "basic 
research is when you don't know what you are doing." See Killian to 
DuBridge, June 25, 1953, CIK MSS, Box 256, folder 14; Kevles, The 
Physicists (1987) p. 383; Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation, 
(1969), pp. 32-33, 267. 
39 See Melvin Kranzberg, "Science, Technology, and Warfare: 
Action, Reaction, and Interaction in the Post-World War II Era," in 
Wright and J. Paszek, eds., Science, Technology, and Warfare (1969), p. 
162; Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), pp. 161-64, 191-94, 
220-21; Kevles, The Physicists (1987), pp. 374-75. 
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delusion that they were engaged in basic research of intrinsic interest 
while in reality they were merely doing the military's bidding. 40 ] I 
must here take issue with him. Certain subjects in physics seem to be 
driven by an internal logic that impels them toward ever-deeper 
understanding of the physical universe; particle physics might qualify 
as an example. Other subjects may draw significance initially from 
their relevance to a technology, yet they can easily take on lives of 
their own as intellectually compelling areas of inquiry. Among the 
numerous instances that come readily to mind, one might mention fluid 
mechanics -- a respected field of physics that owes no small part of 
its development to problems arising from the movement of ship's prows, 
wing surfaces, and missile nose cones through fluids of variable 
density. Whatever the source of interest, it would seem arbitrary to 
say that one type of investigation is truly basic physics, while the 
other is not. 
To embrace such a point of view is to risk conceding the claim 
that physics is characterized by a hierarchy of fields. The claim is 
frequently heard from particle physicists, especially those of the Los 
Alamos generation, who equate the physics they regard as the most 
fundamental with the physics that is the most important. Yet inherent 
in that attitude are value judgments that are not only intellectual but 
social -- judgments whose nature is suggested by the tendency of some 
particle physicists to refer to solid state physics as "squalid state" 
physics. These judgments are not merely that solid state physicis is 
40 Forman, "Behind Quantum Electronics" (1987), p. 185. 
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less worthy because it confronts natural phenomena that are disorderly 
and, hence, intellectually dirty but also because it is involved with 
the practical world -- with microelectronics, with industry, with 
defense. 
The self-image of the Los Alamos generation of physicists had 
its members preponderantly devoted to the pure physics of atomic, 
nuclear, and particle structures and involved in the technologies and 
policies of national security merely as a necessary distraction. Yet 
for many of those physicists, the technological was not a mere 
distraction. The fact of the matter is that even particle physics, 
while intellectually perhaps more elegant, is itself a creature of the 
practical world of national security. One is hard put to imagine the 
great acclerator laboratories in the United States having come into 
being and flourished in the absence of the deep concern for national 
security that came to pervade the United States after World War II. 
The fact of the matter, too, is that between 1945 and 1957 many 
physicists happily involved themselves in -- or piggybacked their 
projects onto --valuable research of technological pertinence. 
The AEC laboratories encountered no serious difficulties in 
recruiting capable physicists for research related to weapons; though 
there were tight security restrictions, the urge for scientific 
exchange and status was served by the evolution of "black" systems of 
scientific communication and reward, including classified meetings, 
journals, and reports. On the campuses, a number of physicists 
perceived the military's interest in technologically oriented research 
as a distinct opportunity. The point is easily demonstrated by the 
25 
electronics research laboratories at MIT and at Stanford, where Felix 
Bloch argued, rightly, that the microwave venture promised to be of 
high value for accelerator physics. Key MIT physicists welcomed ONR's 
establishment there of the Laboratory of Nuclear Studies and 
Engineering, which was heavily concerned with the practical side of 
nuclear studies and which even accepted security restrictions in some 
facets of its research and teaching. Space physicists ostensibly served 
military purposes by collaborating with the armed services to probe the 
upper atmosphere and the lower reaches of space, but by loading 
detection equipment onto B-29s and V-2 rockets, they also accomplished 
a good deal of important research in cosmic ray, solar, and ionspheric 
physics. 4l ] 
The history of postwar physics is to be found not only in the 
great accelerator laboratories but also -- perhaps even more -- in the 
R&D installations of industry such as the Bell Telephone Laboratories 
and in the laboratories of the federal government, both military and 
civilian or those -- such as Los Alamos and Livermore -- that are 
hybrids of the two types. It is also to be found wherever in academia 
that physics has been pursued -- which is not only in departments of 
physics but in departments or programs of space science, astrophysics, 
materials science, electrical engineering, and so on -- all of which 
41 Seidel, "A Home for Big Science" (1986), p. 146; S.S. Schweber, 
"Big Science in Context" (1988), p. 27; Leslie, "Playing the Education 
Game to Win" (1987), pp. 62-63; Needell, "Preparing for the Space Age" 
(1987), p. 97; David Devorkin, "Organizing for Space Research: The V-2 
Rocket Panel," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological 
Sciences, 18:1(1987), 1-24. 
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were doubtless heavily populated by people trained in physics. 
Physics is what physicists do -- or have done. In the first 
decade or so of the Cold War, physicists fanned out into diverse hot 
new areas, each representing the diversification of the field, which 
was a key feature of its postwar restructuring -- and each, too, 
expressing its integration into national security policy, from which it 
derived both opportunity and enrichment. 
27 
Bibliography 
Armacost, Michael, The Politics of Weapons Innovation. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1969. 
Burchard, John, Q.E.D.: MIT in World War II. Cambridge, Mass.: The 
Technology Press, 1948. 
Bush, Vannevar, Modern Arms and Free Men. New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1949. 
C/K MSS. See Compton, Karl T./Ki11ian, James R. 
Compton, Karl T./ Killian, James R., Presidential Files, MIT Archives, 
Cambridge, Mass. 
Dennis, Michael A., "No Fixed Position: University Laboratories and 
Military Patronage at Johns Hopkins and MIT, 1944-1946," unpublished 
manuscript, (1987). 
Devorkin, David, "Organizing for Space Research: The V-2 Rocket Panel," 
HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 
18:1(1987), 1-24. 
Forman, Paul, "Behind Quantum Electronics: National Security as a Basis 
for Physical Research in the United States, 1940-1960," HSPS: 
Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 18:1 
(1987), 149-229. 
Ga1ison, Peter, "Bubble Chambers and the Experimental Workplace," in 
O. Hannaway and P. Achinstein, eds., Experiment and Observation in 
Modern Science (Cambridge: MIT-Bradford Press, 198?), 309-373. 
Ga1ison, Peter, Hev1y, Bruce, and Lowen, Rebecca, "Controlling the 
Monster: Stanford and the Growth of Physics Research, 1935-1962," 
unpublished paper, Workshop in the History of Big Science, Stanford 
University, August 1988. 
Golden, William T., ed., Science Advice to the President. New York: 
Pergamon Press, 1980. 
Golden, William T., Papers: "Government Military-Scientific Research: 
Review for the President of the United States, 1950-51." Niels Bohr 
Library, American Institute of Physics, New York City. 
Hei1bron, J.J., Seidel, Robert W., and Wheaton, Bruce, R., Lawrence and 
His Laboratory: Nuclear Science at Berkeley. 1931-1961 (Berkeley, CA: 
Office for History of Science and Technology, University of California, 
28 
Berkeley, 1981). 
Herken, Gregg, Counsels of War. expanded edition; New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987. 
Hershberg, James G., '" Over My Dead Body /: James B. Conant and the 
Hydrogen Bomb" (1987), to be published in Everett Mendelsohn and 
Merritt Roe Smith, eds., Science and the Military: Sociology of Science 
Yearbook. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988. 
Kevles, Daniel J., The Physicists: The History of a Scientific 
Community in Modern America. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1987. 
Kevles, Daniel J. "K1S2: Korea, Science, and the State," California 
Institute of Technology, Humanities Working Paper 134, July 1988. 
Killian, James R., Sputnik. Scientists. and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the 
First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. 
Koppes, Clayton R., JPL and the American Space Program: A History of 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1982. 
Leslie, Stuart W., "Playing the Education Game to Win: The Military and 
Interdisciplinary Research at Stanford," HSPS: Historical Studies in 
the Physical and Biological Sciences, 18:1(1987), 55-88. 
Needell, Allan A., "Nuclear Reactors and the Founding of Brookhaven 
National Laboratory," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, 14:1(1983), 93-122. 
Neede1l, Allan A., "Preparing for the Space Age: University-Based 
Research, 1946-1957," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, 18:1(1987), 89-110. 
Neede1l, Allan A., "Lloyd Berkner, Merle Tuve, and the Federal Role in 
Radio Astronomy," Osiris, 2nd series, 3(1987), 261-88. 
Ne1kin, Dorothy, The University and Military Research: Moral Politics 
at MIT. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. 
Oppenheimer, J. Robert, Uncommmon Sense. eds., N. Metropolis, Gian-
Carlo Rota, and David Sharp, Boston: Birkhaueser, 1984. 
Reingold, Nathan, ed., The Sciences in the American Context. 
Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979. 
Roland, Alex, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics. 1915-1958. 2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics 
29 
and Space Administration, Scientific and Technical Branch, 1985. 
Schweber, S.S., "The Empiricist Temper Regnant: Theoretical Physics in 
the United States, 1920-1950," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical 
and Biological Sciences, 17:1(1986), 55-98. 
Schweber, S.S., "Big Science in Context: Cornell and MIT," unpublished 
paper, Workshop on Big Science, Stanford University, August 1988. 
Seidel, Robert W., "Acclerating Science: The Postwar Transformation of 
the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory," HSPS: Historical Studies in the 
Physical and Biological Sciences, 13:2(1983), 375-400. 
Seidel, Robert W., "A Home for Big Science: The Atomic Energy 
Commission's Laboratory System," HSPS: Historical Studies in the 
Physical and Biological Sciences, 16:1(1986), 135-176. 
Seidel, Robert W., "From Glow to Flow: A History of Military Laser 
Research and Development," HSPS: Historical Studies in the Physical and 
Biological Sciences, 18:1(1987), 111-148. 
Smith, Merritt Roe, ed., Military Enterprise and Technological Change. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985 
Wright, Monte D. and Paszek, Lawrence J., eds., Science, Technology, 
and Warfare. Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF and United 
States Air Force Academy; Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1969. 
Yanarella, Ernest J" The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, 
Technology. and Politics, 1955-1972. Lexington: Unversity Press of 
Kentucky, 1977. 
York, Herbert F., Making Weapons, Talking Peace: A Physicist's Odyssey 
from Hiroshima to Geneva. New York: Basic Books, 1987. 
York, Herbert F., Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View of the Arms 
Race. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970. 
York, Herbert F. and Greb, Allen G., "Military Research and 
Development: A Postwar History," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
33(1977),13-76. 
Zacharias, Jerrold R., with Myles Gordon, "Military Technology: One of 
the Lives of J.R. Zacharias," ms of a draft autobiography (1986). 

